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I
Egalitarians believe that we have a pro tanto moral reason to avoid leaving
some people worse off than others. At the same time, many contemporary egali-
tarians accept that we should sometimes hold people responsible for the conse-
quences of their choices, even when doing so requires us to leave them worse off
than others.1 The realization that both of these commitments might be conjunc-
tively affirmed, first suggested by Dworkin in 1981, brought about an enduring
shift in the argumentative landscape of political theory, in the form of a new and
very influential theory of justice: choice-sensitive egalitarianism.2 Reflecting the
importance of this shift, it is hardly surprising that one of the most frequently
quoted lines of recent political theory is G. A. Cohen’s claim that Dworkin has
“performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within
it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of
choice and responsibility.”3
What is, perhaps, more surprising, is that despite the major impact that
Dworkin’s move has had on political theory, and despite the multifarious varia-
tions on Dworkin’s theory that have since emerged, there has been very little
written on why egalitarians ought accede to the right’s demand that we hold people
responsible for their choices. That is, while there has been plenty of discus-
sion about how egalitarians might combine a commitment to equality with a
commitment to holding people responsible for their choices, there has been almost
no discussion of the underlying justification for doing so, and even less discussion
of whether the underlying justification is genuinely consistent with a commitment
to egalitarianism.
One apparently persuasive rationale for holding people responsible for their
choices is as follows.4 If we fail to hold people responsible for their choices, if we
remedy all disadvantage which it is possible to remedy, then people would be able
to take advantage of others for their own benefit. They would be able to do so by
making risky, reckless, or imprudent choices, in the knowledge that others will
burden the cost of bailing them out of any misfortune they suffer as a result of
their choice. Since the choices that agents would make under such a system would
often not give due weight to the interests of others, such a system would fail to
ensure that an optimal balancing of people’s interests is achieved.5 To illustrate
the rationale, consider the following example, described by one of the principal
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advocates of the view, Zofia Stemplowska. Stemplowska poses the question,
should society offer free leg-mending operations to those who break their legs
while bungee jumping uninsured in order to remedy the disadvantage suffered
by such agents (notwithstanding any additional temporary disadvantage in the
form of uncompensated pain and inconvenience)?6 If society were to offer free
leg-mending operations, then we could expect that bungee jumpers would take
advantage of the offer by bungee jumping uninsured, safe in the knowledge that, if
they break their legs, others will bear the cost of repairing them. But by choosing
to bungee jump uninsured, they would fail to give due weight to the potentially
weightier interest that other members of society have in not having to pay the
cost of leg-mending operations for uninsured bungee jumpers. If that interest is
indeed weightier, then society should protect the interest by declining to offer free
leg-mending operations to those who break their legs while bungee jumping
uninsured. Doing so will leave such agents disadvantaged relative to others, but,
on the interest-based account, their disadvantage will be justified, because the
balance of interests requires that such agents should be held responsible for their
choices.
The interest-based rationale appears to provide a powerful reason to hold
agents responsible for their choices. By so doing, it offers an apparently persua-
sive case for preferring choice-sensitive egalitarianism to a form of egalitarianism
that treats all disadvantages, whether or not the result of choice, as unjustified.
Moreover, the rationale suggests an attractive answer to the question, when should
choices be treated as justifying disadvantage? According to the rationale, we
should treat choices as justifying disadvantage (provided that certain additional
considerations relating to duties and rights are satisfied), when, and only when,
doing otherwise would allow agents to make choices that fail to give due weight
to the interest-based entitlements of others. In cases that do not meet this criterion,
egalitarians would have a reason to treat disadvantage arising from choice as
unjustified, grounded in the undefeated interest that the choice bearer has in being
able to pursue a particular activity while limiting his exposure to attendant risks.7
As Segall notes, the interest-based rationale therefore suggests a criterion for
disadvantage-justifying choice along the following lines: choices justify disad-
vantage only when it would be reasonable for society to expect the agent to choose
otherwise.8 The reference to the reasonable expectations of others in this formu-
lation would, according to the interest-based rationale, denote the importance of
taking into account, when deciding whether to treat a choice as justifying disad-
vantage or not, not only the interests of the choice-bearer, but also the interests of
those who would have to bail the choice bearer out, if the choice were treated as
failing to justify disadvantage.9
Attractive though the interest-based rationale appears to be, I shall argue that
it faces a deep structural problem. The problem is this. Egalitarians—including
advocates of the interest-based rationale—explicitly endorse the claim that agents
ought, prior to making any choices that might justify disadvantage, start from a
position of equal options.10 Such a commitment seems central to egalitarianism: at
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a minimum, egalitarians care about inequalities that are due to unchosen circum-
stance, and inequalities in initial choice sets certainly fall into that category. If
agents do not even start from equal starting points, it is hard to see why an
egalitarian should be concerned from the point of view of equality about what
happens thereafter. Egalitarians who endorse the interest-based rationale maintain
that there is no conflict between a commitment to equality of options and her
interest-based rationale for treating some choices as justifying disadvantage. But
the interest-based rationale is, I shall argue, quite incompatible with a commit-
ment to equality of options. Egalitarians must therefore, upon pain of abandoning
their egalitarianism, reject the interest-based rationale.
II
To see why the interest-based rationale is in conflict with a commitment to
equality of options, consider a further example, also taken from Stemplowska’s
discussion of the rationale. Suppose that all agents face the same, equally valuable
set of options. They can choose whether or not to own a car. If they choose to own
a car, then they all face an equal risk that the car will break down, and that it will be
costly to repair. Car owners can reduce the risk that their car will break down by
sending it for regular servicing. Nevertheless, car owners cannot avoid the danger
of disadvantage altogether, without some intervention on the part of other agents:
whether or not they get their car serviced, there is a risk that the car will break down.
Suppose that some cars break down. Should we treat the owners of these cars
as having suffered unjustified disadvantage, and so as having a claim for repair at
the expense of society? As Stemplowska argues, the interest-based rationale will
claim that whether or not we should do so depends on the balance of interests.
Suppose, then, that the interest that car owners have in being able to drive a
serviced car without bearing the risk of a costly repair outweighs the interest that
other agents have in not having to pay for such repairs. And suppose that the
interest that cars owners have in being able to drive an unserviced car without
bearing the (greater) risk of a costly repair does not outweigh the interest that other
agents have in not having to pay for such repairs. As such, the interest-based
rationale recommends that society commit to treating the disadvantage suffered by
those agents whose cars break down as unjustified, and so to repairing their cars
for free, if and only if they have serviced their car.
So far so good. But this is where the interest-based rationale runs up against a
commitment to equality of options, despite the claim of its advocates that there is no
conflict between the two. To see why it does so, we need to take a step back and
consider what it means for agents to face equally valuable options. One view about
what a commitment to equality of options requires is that it requires only that
agents’ best options are equally valuable.11 Another view claims that we ought also
take into account the value of agents’ suboptimal options.12 Whichever of these
interpretations of equality of options one prefers, what is important to the present
argument is that they all share one key feature, by virtue of which they all end up
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being incompatible with the interest-based rationale for distinguishing between
justified and unjustified disadvantages. The feature is that, when any of the views
claim that an option faced by one agent is as valuable as an option faced by another
agent, whether that option is the optimal option or a suboptimal option, they need
not—and indeed cannot—mean that the option to φ is as valuable for one agent as
the option to φ is for another. This is because agents have different preferences, and
so will rank options differently. In the present example, the best option for some
agents might be to own a serviced car. For others, the best option might be to own
an unserviced car. For others, no car at all. Equality of options merely requires,
at a minimum, that each agent’s best option, whatever that option is, is as good
as other agents’ best options. And, if suboptimal options are also to be taken into
account, then it may also require that their second best option is as good as other
agents’ second best options, and so on.13 So, for example, equality of options could
be satisfied if owning a serviced car is as good for some agents as owning no car is
for others, and owning no car is as good for the former group of agents as owning
an unserviced car is for the latter group, and owning an unserviced car is as good
for the former group as owning a serviced car is for the latter group.
Consider now what effect the introduction of a commitment to repair serviced
cars for free would have on the comparative value of agents’ options. The com-
mitment has the effect of making the option to own a serviced car rather more
valuable than it would have been without the commitment, because the commit-
ment increases the expected benefit of owning a serviced car by removing any risk
of having to pay to repair a broken down serviced car oneself. The value of all
other options is unaffected by the commitment. As such, the commitment will
disproportionately benefit those agents for whom owning a serviced car was,
without the commitment, the best option. Such agents now enjoy a much better
best option than do agents for whom owning a serviced car was not, without the
commitment, the best option.14 We cannot, therefore, guarantee that a distribution
of options that is equal before the commitment to repairing serviced cars is
introduced will remain equal after it is introduced. The interest-based rationale is
not compatible with the preservation of equality of options.
III
Advocates of the interest-based rationale claim that the rationale is compat-
ible with the preservation of equality of options. Against this claim, I have thus far
argued that it is not. But one might object that the interest-based rationale need
not, in order to be amenable to egalitarians, be compatible with the preservation
of equality of options, relative to a situation in which equality of options obtained
but no indemnities were offered. Rather, one might think that the interest-based
rationale need only be compatible with equality of options in the sense that it must
be possible for society to adopt an indemnity scheme that both reflects the balance
of interests and offers equal options to all agents. Such a scheme need not preserve
equality of options, goes the objection, it need only ensure that equality of options
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now obtains, whatever went before. Stemplowska herself does seem to endorse
the claim that a scheme that can be justified by the interest-based rationale will
preserve equality of options, but let us consider nevertheless whether this weaker
way of being compatible with equality of options can rescue the interest-based
rationale.15
Can the weaker version of compatibility rescue the interest-based rationale
from the complaint that it is not compatible with equality of options? The problem
with the weaker version is that, while it rejects the use of a no-indemnity equal
options scenario as the comparator against which interests are to be measured, the
putative interpretation offers no alternative comparator scenario. But we need a
comparator scenario in order to make sense of the claim that it would be in some
agents’ interests if society were to adopt an indemnity scheme. We cannot simply
stipulate that the comparator scenario be such that, if an indemnity scheme were
offered that reflected the balance of interests, then equality of options would
obtain. Aside from the obvious argumentative fallacy of making such a stipulation,
doing so would leave the interest-based rationale redundant, since adoption of the
scheme would need no more justification that provided by a commitment to
equality of options.
It does not help, then, to argue that the interest-based rationale need only be
compatible with equality of options in the sense that it must be possible for society
to adopt an indemnity scheme that both reflects the balance of interests and offers
equal options to all agents. Nor does it help to suppose that the interest-based
rationale need only be compatible with bringing about equality of options, relative
to whatever pattern of options would in fact obtain without the scheme. The
problem with this interpretation is that whether or not it is possible for society to
adopt an indemnity scheme that both reflects the balance of interests and leaves all
agents facing equal options will depend on contingent facts about how options
actually turn out to be distributed in the real world. It is possible that without the
scheme, agents might face a pattern of options such that if the scheme were
adopted, then this would happen to coincide exactly with the pattern of interven-
tions that would be required to bring about equality of options. But such a
coincidence would be extremely unlikely. In any case, the contingent nature of the
possible coincidence is enough to reject the claim that the interest-based rationale
is compatible with equality of options, since that claim requires a non-contingent
guarantee that the two will not conflict.16
IV
The interest-based rationale for distinguishing between justified and unjusti-
fied disadvantage requires us to remedy misfortune in a way that is incompatible
with the preservation of equality of options or, more generally, with any plausible
interpretation of a commitment to equality of options. Note that my claim is not
merely that a commitment to distinguishing between justified and unjustified
disadvantage arising from choice is in conflict with the preservation of equality of
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options. Rather, my claim is that a commitment to distinguishing between justified
and unjustified disadvantage arising from choice grounded in the interest-based
rationale is in conflict with the preservation of equality of options. The former
claim, in fact, would be false. We can imagine a scheme that treats some disad-
vantages arising from choice as unjustified, but not others, without threatening
equality of options. In the car case, for example, consider the following insurance
scheme, along the lines of (but not quite identical to) that which Otsuka thinks is
required by a commitment to egalitarianism.17 The insurance scheme is such that
car owners are able to insure against the risk that their car will break down in
return for a premium paid to society that offsets the unequalizing additional
benefit that the offer of free repair provides. The disadvantage borne by agents
who take out the insurance is treated as unjustified, and their cars are repaired at
no further cost. The disadvantage borne by agents who decline the insurance is
treated as justified, and their cars are not repaired at society’s expense. Equality of
options is preserved by such a scheme, provided that the premium is set such that
the option to pay the premium and receive the insurance against breakdown is,
for the agent concerned, as good as, but no better than, the option not to pay the
premium and not to receive any insurance against breakdown.18 But such a scheme
would not be compatible with the interest-based rationale for distinguishing
between justified and unjustified disadvantage. This is because the interest-based
rationale relies on recipients of the indemnity having an interest in being so
indemnified. And under the putative insurance scheme, agents have no interest in
being insured, since the cost of the premium to them perfectly offsets the benefit
of the indemnity.19
The argument thus far suggests that the problem with the interest-based
rationale for holding agents responsible for some of their choices is as follows.
The rationale supposes that choice bearers have an interest in being indemnified
against certain risks: the rationale then has us ask whether, in any particular case,
the choice bearer’s interest outweighs the interest that others have in offering
such indemnity. If the indemnity is offered at no cost to choice bearers, then
choice bearers will indeed have an interest in being offered the indemnity, so the
rationale initially appears to succeed. But the success is illusionary, because if
the indemnity is offered at no cost to choice bearers, then the provision of the
indemnity would fail to preserve equality of options, which advocates of the
interest-based rationale rightly identifies as a key egalitarian commitment. On
the other hand, equality of options could be preserved if choice bearers are
offered an indemnity in return for a premium that fully offsets the additional
benefit that they gain from the indemnity. But if choice bearers are charged a
fully offsetting premium, then the interest-based rationale would not then apply,
because choice bearers would have no interest in such a scheme. Since egalitar-
ians cannot, on pain of abandoning their egalitarianism, dispense with the
commitment to equality of options, the argument thus far suggests that they
should endorse the latter scheme over the former and reject the interest-based
rationale.20
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VIf egalitarians must reject the interest-based rationale for holding agents
responsible for their choices, then where does this leave the project of justifying
choice-sensitive egalitarianism? One option is for choice-sensitive egalitarians to
follow G. A. Cohen in insisting that their commitment to holding agents respon-
sible for their choices, like their commitment to remedying disadvantages for
which agents are not responsible, is a fundamental moral conviction which does
not admit of further justification.21 Such a position is possible, but somewhat
unsatisfactory, in that it leaves choice-sensitive egalitarians with nothing to say in
defense of their view to those who do not to share the supposedly fundamental
moral conviction. Perhaps more damaging still, such a position leaves choice-
sensitive egalitarians with nothing to say to those who insist that the intuitions that
support choice-sensitivity are not fundamental, but do in fact reflect the sorts of
interest-based considerations that have attracted some to the interest-based
rationale—and that, since such considerations are incompatible with egalitarian-
ism, we should reject egalitarianism. An alternative rationale for holding agents
responsible for their choices, one which is compatible with equality of options,
would allow choice-sensitive egalitarians to answer both of these critics. More-
over, so little has thus far been written on the reasons for holding agents respon-
sible for their choices that it is too early to give up on the search for a justification
that is compatible with egalitarianism. Much has been written on the question,
“when should egalitarians hold agents responsible for their choices?” If nearly as
much attention were to be directed to the prior question, “why should egalitarians
hold agents responsible for their choices,” doubtless a better picture of the under-
lying justificatory terrain would start to emerge.22
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